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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE ANALYSIS OF BUDGETING SYSTEM REFORM  
IN THAILAND 
 
By 
 
Sawanya  Coompanthu 
 
 
The importance of budgeting system reform has already gained a widespread 
recognition for the past decades.  Part of this trend was largely driven by overt public 
dissatisfaction and dwindling resources.  Many countries, therefore, have adopted 
Performance-Based Budgeting System to some degree in order to link measured 
results with allocations of funding.  This mechanism allowed policy makers to make 
informed choices among competing interests and encouraged line agencies to 
perform efficiently and effectively.  As well in Thailand, the government tried to 
reform the nation’s budgeting system to be more result-based by replacing the 
traditional Line-item (input-based) Budgeting with the Planning-Program Budgeting 
(PPB) in 1982 and, for the second round, implementing the Strategic Performance 
Based Budgeting System (SPBB) in 2003.  Emphasizing on the current budgeting 
system, this study was to examine the reform’s direction and find out ‘what causes’ a 
slow progress of SPBB reform in Thailand.  Finally, the analysis found that the 
reform was already on the right track with a great plan and mostly appropriate 
supporting techniques and tools.  However, Thai’s government needs to concern 
more about building capacity and co-operation among the participants and 
stakeholders in order to overcome all existing barriers and accomplish the ultimate 
reform goals.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
The Importance of the Study 
 “Budget” is the most important economic policy instrument for government.  
It serves numerous socio-economic purposes by allocating resources in ways that 
promote growth and equity.  The “Budgeting System” concerns the decisions how 
much money to spend and what to spend it on.  Through the budgeting system, the 
government determines the allocation of the resources among the agencies and these 
decisions resulting affect the nation as a whole.   
 Since the 19th century, the evolution of budgeting has influenced the practice 
of resource allocation and use in all countries.  However, budgets in developing 
countries have not been as effective as they should be.  While many countries differ 
in the magnitude of their budgetary problems, there has been increased acceptance 
by governments that the structure of the budget process and institutions influence 
budgetary results.  This is why the agenda to reform the budgeting system, in order 
to achieve a durable budgetary condition, has been given such a high priority in 
many countries – including Thailand. 
The Royal Thai Government has introduced a number of reforms to its 
budget implementation and management procedures since the early 1980s.  However, 
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the reform efforts were accelerated by the financial crisis in 1997 and by the effects 
of the new constitution which was also promulgated in 1997.  Consequently, in 
February 2001, the government has announced to expedite budget reform process so 
that budgeting becomes an effective and efficient tool for translating policies into 
tangible results, while empowering ministers, ministries and departments to manage 
with greater accountability and transparency coupled with comprehensive 
performance monitoring and evaluation system.  And hence, in 2003, a “Strategic 
Performance Based Budgeting System” (SPBB) has been implemented in accordance 
with the current administrative system. 
Although Thai’s government has been practiced the SPBB for more than four 
years, the overall budgeting system – especially the allocation and execution – still 
be perceived as inefficient, ineffective, and unaccountable.  According to the 
historical performances, the significant amounts of transferring/ changing funds at 
the end of fiscal year, the delayed of budget spending, the numbers of duplicated 
output among agencies, the numbers of project failure and the corruptions implied 
that the SPBB reform in Thailand still be far to reach its aims.  Why would that be?  
How did they reform and did it work?  What should they do to accomplish the 
reform?  All these questions need to be answered in order to assure that Thai’s 
government is on the right track for developing its budgeting system.  To do so, an 
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analysis of the SPBB is necessary.  Therefore, the government could realize the 
current situation of the budgeting system reform including the problems and 
obstacles that occurred.  Finally, this will lead to a consideration for the crucial 
success factors along with the further steps that could bring the Thai’s government an 
achievement of all budgeting system reform’s goals in the near future.   
  
The Objectives of the Study 
 To review the evolution of budgeting system reform in Thailand 
 To review the key principles, accountability and structure of the SPBB as a 
current budgeting system in Thailand   
 To analyze the SPBB in order to understand its current situation and be able 
to point out the problems/ obstacles which related to the improvement and 
development of this particular budgeting system 
 To identify the crucial success factors and to recommend the future steps of 
the budgeting system reform plan 
 
Scope of the Study 
 The focus of this thesis is to study and analyze the budgeting system reform 
in Thailand.  The scope of the contexts covered only the expenditure side, not the 
revenue side.  Although the study included an evolution of the budgeting system but 
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the analysis emphasized only on the current practicing budgeting system, the 
“Strategic Performance Based Budgeting System” (SPBB).  Also, the best practice of 
other countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia has 
been discussed but the study did not compare Thai’s budgeting system with any other 
countries. 
 
Research Methodology  
Primary data is collected by interviewing with the executives and staffs from 
the Bureau of the Budget (Thailand) in related departments such as Budget System 
Development Office, Budget Policy Office, Budget Preparation Offices, Law and 
Regulation Office, Evaluation Offices, and Standard Costing Office. 
Secondary data, the primary source of information for writing this thesis, is 
collected from the internet web-sites and through literature review of related articles 
and documents both published and unpublished.  These also included the documents 
from other related organizations such as the Ministry of Finance, the Office of the 
Public Sector Development Commission and from the academic institutes in 
Thailand as well. 
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Structure of the Thesis 
 The thesis is divided into five chapters.  After the Introductory Chapter, 
theoretical approaches to public budgeting and the best practices of other countries – 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (Victoria State) – are discussed 
in chapter two.  Chapter three contains a brief review of Thai’s budgeting system 
background including the structure of governance, the information about the Bureau 
of the Budget, budget law, and annual budgeting processes.  Chapter four and five 
are the main body of the thesis.  Chapter four contains an analysis of budgeting 
system reform in Thailand from the former- to the current year.  More emphasis is 
given to the current budgeting system aspect.  Its key principles, structure, and 
techniques/ tools are discussed.  Moreover, the problems and obstacles related to the 
improvement and development of the current budgeting system are pointed out.  
Finally, chapter five presents the conclusion and recommendations including the 
lessons learned, possible solutions and crucial success factors which should be 
considered for the future steps of the reforming plan. 
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Chapter II 
Theory of Public Budgeting & International Best Practices 
 
Theoretical approaches to Public Budgeting 
 The Definition & Concepts 
“Budget” generally refers to a list of all quantify-planned expenses and 
revenues over a definitive time period.  It gives an overall picture of where the money 
is coming from, when it is coming in, and how it is being spent.  The key concepts of 
“Budgets” and “Budgeting” are [1] Who gets how much for what purpose and who 
pays?,  [2] Primary resource allocation process (expenditures) and resource extraction 
process (revenue),  [3] Achieves institutional priorities efficiently, economically, and 
effectively, and [4] Opposing and reconciling different values.1 
For the government, “Public Budgeting” is a tool for allocating resources 
and implementing strategic plans in each fiscal year.  It may be stated that a public 
budget is an instrument at the disposal of the legislative authority.  It enables to guide 
the economic, social, political and other activities of a community in a certain 
direction in order to realize predetermined goals and objectives, the results of which 
are not always quantifiable.  The budget also contains all of the measures needed to 
subordinate the executive authority to the legislative authority as the representative 
                                            
1 Michael Harris and Timothy Griffith, Budgeting : Leadership - Theory - Process and Practice,  
   Business and Finance, Eastern Michigan University, November 2002. 
 7
of the voters and taxpayers. The features of a public budget ensure the unique 
foundation on which its preparation, approval and execution are based.  In public 
administration the budget serves as a decision-making instrument by which priorities 
are set, goals and objective are established, operating programs are compiled and 
control exercised.  A budget document is the final product in the budget process and 
it should be suitable for consideration and approval by the legislative authority, while 
the execution of its contents should realize public objectives.  The quality of the 
budget depends on the accuracy of the supporting data, the quality of the methods 
used and the expertise as well as the integrity with which it has been compiled.2 
 The Principles 
“Public Budgeting” contains the expenditure plan, as well as the revenue 
estimates, of the government.  The classical principles for appraising budgets are3 
[1] Comprehensiveness : The budget should include all receipts and outlays 
of the government.  The single process would include all activities of the government. 
[2] Unity : All spending and revenue-collecting parts should be related to 
each other.  Consistent evaluation criteria should be applied to any expenditure, 
regardless of the government area in which it is located. 
                                            
2 Mihaly Hogye, Theoretical Approaches to Public Budgeting.  
3 John L. Mikesell, Fiscal Administration—Analysis and Applications for the Public Sector, 
   Pacific Grove, California, 1991. 
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[3] Exclusiveness : Only financial matters should be in the budget.  
[4] Specification : The budget should be executed as it is enacted.  Cavalier 
changes should not be made during the budget year. 
[5] Annually : The budget should be prepared every year for the next year of 
agency existence. 
[6] Accuracy : Forecasts should be as reasonable as possible and the 
document should be internally consistent. 
[7] Clarity : The budget should describe what is proposed in understandable 
fashion.  The document, in an effort to encompass all, should not bury policy intent 
in line-item detail. 
[8] Publicity : The budget in a representative democracy should not be secret.  
However, the most important budget related rules are comprehensiveness and 
a multi-year perspective in budget elaboration, and the capability for monitoring 
implementation so as to further accountability and timely adjustments.4  These also 
partly correspond with specification, clarity and publicity.   
 The Formats 
The format of public budgeting system is determined by the level at which 
governments need to control and manage budgets.  The well-known and widely-used 
                                            
4 Francois Lacasse, Budget and Policy Making : Issues, Tensions and Solutions in Budgeting and  
   Policy Making, Paris: Sigma Papers: No. 8, 1996. 
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formats can be summarized as follow5 
[1] Line-item Budgeting : refers to objects or lines of expenditure – for 
example : personnel, supplies, contractual services, capital outlay – that are the focus 
of development, analysis, authorization and control of the budget.  Even when a 
more complex budgeting technique is used, the line-item budget usually exists. 
 
Purpose Financial accountability 
Central Question Is the money being spent according to intention? 
Problem to be Solved Preventing misappropriation of funds 
Strengths 
 
 Simplicity, ease of preparation, and 
recognition by all involved in process 
 
 Save time 
 
 High degree of control and allow for 
accumulation of expenditures at 
functional level 
 
 Accumulation of expenditure data by 
organization for use in trend or 
historical analysis 
Weaknesses 
 No incentive to change 
 
 Generally prohibits shifting funds 
among budget categories 
 
 Presents little useful information on 
functions and activities of organizations
 
 Not good for dealing with questions of 
efficiency, effectiveness, future and/or 
neglected concerns 
 
 
[2] Planning-Programming Budgeting (PPB) : refers to budgets that are 
formulated and appropriated on the basis of expected results of services to be carried 
out by programs.  Emphasis placed on identifying objectives of governmental entity 
and relating all program expenditures to these activities.  The budget request and 
report are summarized in terms of broad programs rather than detail of line-item 
                                            
5 Douglas Morgan and Kent Robinson, Handbook on Public Budgeting, Hatfield School of   
   Government Executive Leadership Institute, Portland State University, 2002 
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which is less control and evaluation oriented.  Conceptual framework focuses on 
long-term costs of programs and evaluation of different program alternatives that 
may be used to attain long-term goals and objectives.  This format is considered as a 
transitional form between traditional line-item and performance budgeting.   
 
Purpose Program accountability 
Central Question Is the program achieving its goals and objectives? 
Problem to be Solved Program effectiveness 
Strengths 
 Provides clear linkage between program 
activities and budget allocation 
 Expenditures tied to agency goals and 
long-term planning  -- links parts to 
whole and present to future 
 Useful quantitative tools 
 Accountability mechanism 
 
 
Weaknesses 
 Consensus on fundamental objectives  
of governmental entity is difficult to 
reach 
 
 Development of long-term cost/benefit 
projections and program alternatives-
difficult and expensive undertaking 
 
 Difficult to administer since 
expenditures may cross organizational 
units-problem controlling expenditures 
and responsibility accounting – high 
potential for conflict 
 
 Trained budget analysts required 
 
 Voluminous amounts of data 
 
[3] Performance Budgeting : Similar to planning-programming budgeting, 
performance budgets are constructed by program but focus on program goals and 
objectives; measured by short-term outputs, projected longer term outcomes, and 
cost/benefits analysis.  Appropriations are not only linked with programs, but also 
with expected results specified by these performance criteria. 
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Purpose Program efficiency/effectiveness 
Central Question Is the program cost-effective?  Is the program effective? 
Problem to be Solved Measures of what is being accomplished 
Strengths 
 
 
 Comprehensive decision making 
 
 Expedites appropriation process 
 
 Internal managerial control 
 
 Provides more useful information for 
legislative consideration and clearer 
basis for evaluation of administrators 
 
 Organizes budget into quantitative 
estimates of costs and accomplishments
 
 Eases legislative budget revisions since 
program activities/levels of service 
budgeted based on standard cost inputs 
 
Weaknesses 
 Time-consuming and expensive 
 High potential for resistance because  
of fear of measures being used to 
penalize 
 Difficult to measure -- Limited in 
measuring effectiveness 
 Need a reliable standard cost 
information 
 
 
 
[4] Zero-Based Budgeting : subjects all programs, activities and expenditures 
to justification annually.  Central point is the elimination of outdated efforts and 
expenditures and concentration of resources where most effective.  Funding requests 
recommendations and allocations for existing and new programs are usually ranked 
in priority order on the basis of alternative service levels, which are lower, equal to 
and higher than current levels. This process can be used in conjunction with either 
line-item budgeting and/or planning-programming budgeting. 
 
Purpose Priority and appropriateness of what is and should be done 
Central Question What should we be doing?   Are we giving appropriate priority 
to current programs/ activities? 
Problem to be Solved Deciding whether to continue doing what has been done in the 
past 
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Strengths 
 Provides opportunity for existing 
assumptions and activities to be               
re-examined 
 Provides opportunity to reallocate 
resources 
 Focus on results & outcomes 
 Rational and Objective 
 Emphasizes what needs to be budgeted 
 Most useful when overall spending 
must be reduced 
 
Weaknesses 
 Places a high burden on organizational 
resources 
 Threatening -- usually create resistance
 Difficult to achieve comparability 
across organizational units 
 No budget history 
 Time consuming 
 Ad-hoc judgments 
 Requires great deal of staff time, 
planning, and paperwork to be 
worthwhile 
 May only be appropriate for some 
activities on a periodic basis 
 
The best practices of international countries 
 In 1990s and 2000s, many governments have taken steps to make the budgets 
of their countries more performance-oriented.  The information about international 
experiences in the implementation of Performance-based budgeting (PBB) including 
the best practices and valuable lessons are widely available from various countries.   
In initiating performance-based budgeting system, Thai’s government is 
attempted to learn from the developed countries which have employed performance 
and output or results-oriented budgeting practices over the past decade with more 
progressive and some success.  However, the best practices are based on different 
countries’ experiences in each area and are not meant to constitute as a formal 
standard.  Finally, the United States-, the United Kingdom-, and Australia (Victoria 
State) systems are considered as the appropriate models for PBB reforming in 
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Thailand.  Their systems have some features – such as the medium-term financial 
planning, the contract for results, and the performance evaluating tool – that can 
support Thailand, if well implemented, to achieve its budgeting system reform 
targets.     
 The United States 
In the United States, the federal budget is prepared by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and submitted to Congress for consideration.  The 
budget process has three main phases which are [1] Formulation of the President’s 
proposed budget, [2] Congressional action on the budget, and [3] Budget execution.  
The budget year (fiscal year) begins on October 1st and ends on September 30th.  The 
following timetable highlights the scheduled dates for significant budget events 
during the year. 
Timetable : Budget Calendar 
Between the 1st Monday in January 
and the 1st Monday in February 
President transmits the budget 
Six weeks later Congressional committees report budget estimates to 
Budget Committees. 
April 15 Action to be completed on congressional budget resolution.
May 15 House consideration of annual appropriations bills may 
begin. 
June 15 Action to be completed on reconciliation. 
June 30 Action on appropriations to be completed by House. 
July 15 President transmits Mid-Session Review of the budget. 
October 1 Fiscal year begins 
15 days after the end of a session of 
Congress 
OMB issues final sequestration report, and the President 
issues a sequestration order, if necessary. 
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Performance-based budgeting (PBB) is used as a results-oriented system – 
guided not by process but guided by performance.6  The system emphasizes on 
productivity, effective outputs, quality in terms of accuracy, and timeliness.  Also, the 
linkages between agencies’ strategic plans that consist of strategic objectives, output-
goals, and outcome-goals and their budget requested are the core consideration for 
budget allocation.  For the budget execution, transfer authority varies from agency to 
agency.  Transfers are frequently limited to 1-2 percent of appropriations for the 
agency and often require approval by congress.   However, the transfers between 
capital investments or transfer programs and operating expenditures are not 
permitted. 
The budget documents provide information on all Federal agencies and 
programs including performance targets as well as reports on performance in relation 
to last year’s targets.  The budget is generally reporting on a cash basis with the 
exemptions of interest expenses, certain employee pension plans, and loan and 
guarantee programs which are treated on accrual basis.  Moreover, the budget 
presents on-budget and off-budget totals.  The off-budget totals include the 
transactions excluded by law from the budget totals.  The on-budget and off-budget 
amounts are added together to derive the totals for the Federal Government.  These 
                                            
6 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), The president’s management agenda, FY 2002 
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are referred to as the unified or consolidated budget totals.7  The budget covers at 
least the four years following the budget year in order to reflect the effect of budget 
decisions over the longer term. 
In addition, the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) was developed to 
assess and improve program performance so that the Federal government can 
achieve better results.  PART is a questionnaire used to evaluate a program’s purpose, 
design, planning, management, results, and accountability to determine its overall 
effectiveness.  Individual program ratings are a core part of this process.  Federal 
agencies and OMB work together to decide which programs will be reviewed each 
year using the PART. 
 The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the budget is prepared by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and must be passed by Parliament.  The public expenditure framework is 
based on four key principles which are [1] consistency with a long-term, prudent and 
transparent regime for managing the public finances as a whole, [2] the judgment of 
success by policy outcomes rather than resource inputs, [3] strong incentives for 
departments and their partners in service delivery to plan over several years and plan 
together where necessary, and [4] the proper costing and management of capital 
                                            
7 Budget System and Concepts and Glossary,  Analytical Perspectives, www.gpoaccess.gov  
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assets to provide the right incentives for public investment.   
Since 1997, the Treasury presents two economic forecasts per year.  In Spring, 
the Chancellor presents the Budget , and in Autumn, the Pre-Budget Report (PBR) is 
released.  The time-frame of budget events can be summarized as follow8 
 
Timetable : Budget Calendar 
 
 
 
Spring Budget 
 
2nd  April 
 
 Publication of Annual Expenditure Report 
 
 
April / May 
 Finance Committee oversees consultation process 
with subject committees 
 Subject committees examine relevant chapter 
 Send reports to Finance Committee 
 
End Year Flexibility 
Announcement 
(before or after 
Summer Recess) 
 
 
June 
 
 Finance Committee Reports to Parliament 
 Parliament debates this Report 
 
 
 
Spending Review 
 
 
 
Sep 
 Executive publishes draft Budget and Spending 
Plans 
 Subject committees examine and send reports to 
Finance Committee 
 
Autumn revisions 
 
Oct  Finance Committee considers the draft budget and 
may propose alternative 
 
Pre-Budget Report 
 
Nov / Dec  Finance Committee Report  Parliament debates Report  (mid December) 
 
 
Spring revisions 
 
Jan  Executive produces proposals  
       (having considered Parliament's recommendations) 
 
Jan / Feb 
 Parliament debates Budget Bill 
 Executive amendments and Parliamentary vote 
 
The framework of public expenditure is divided between Departmental 
Expenditure Limits (DEL) and Annually Managed Expenditure (AME).9   
Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) are planned and controlled on a 
three year basis in biennial Spending Reviews.  To encourage departments to plan 
over the medium term and removes the perverse incentive to use up their provision 
                                            
8 The Scottish Parliament - Information Center : The Annual Budget Process, April 2002 
9 Barrett B. Anderson, Biennial Budgeting : The UK’s public expenditure framework, July 2005 
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as the year end approaches without regard to value for money, departments may 
carry forward unspent DEL provision from one year into the next.  However, for the 
full benefits to feed through into improved public service delivery, it is important 
that end-year flexibility and three year budgets are cascaded from departments to 
executive agencies and other budget holders.   
Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) is an expenditure which cannot 
reasonably be subject to firm, multi-year limits in the same way as DEL.  AME 
includes social security benefits, local authority self-financed expenditure, payments 
under the Common Agricultural Policy, debt interest, and net payments to EU 
institutions.  AME is reviewed twice a year as part of the Budget and Pre-Budget 
Report process.  The close integration of the tax and benefit system provides a strong 
rationale for consideration of AME in the annual budget cycle.  Together, DEL plus 
AME sum to Total Managed Expenditure (TME), the broadest measure of total 
public expenditure. 
Three-year Publish Service Agreement (PSA) which sets out a government's 
high-level aim, priority objectives and key outcome-based performance targets is 
negotiated between each of the main Departments and HM Treasury during the 
Spending Review process.  At the same time, the government committed itself by 
providing the Service Delivery Agreement (SDA) which sets out departments' agreed 
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strategy for delivering those high-level objectives, and how they needed to change 
internally to achieve best value for money in doing so.  Currently, the government is 
implementing a full accruals system.  High flexibility budget execution is provided.  
Agencies can freely transfer the operating appropriations to capital expenditures.  In 
addition, the budget information is published in the Economic and Fiscal Strategy 
Report (EFSR) and the Financial Statement and Budget Report (FSBR).10 
 Australia (Victoria State) 
In the Australian state of Victoria, the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC), 
a sub-committee of Cabinet, is responsible for monitoring all government funding 
decisions.  The committee is comprised of the Premier, Deputy Premier, Treasurer, 
Minister for Finance, Minister for Transport, Minister for Education & Training, and 
Minister for Industrial Relations.  The government sector has two budgeting 
processes. 11   First is the “State budget process” which draws together the 
government’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the budget year.  This is 
called the external budget which provides appropriations to departments to deliver 
output.  Second is a “Departments’ own budget setting process” or internal budget.  
It is part of a department’s internal financial management and is important for 
business planning, resource allocation, and performance management. 
                                            
10 The United Kingdom’s HM Treasury web-site, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk   
11 Auditor General Victoria, Budget development and management within departments : State  
     and Internal  budgets, May 2004 
 19
The State budget process is underpinned by the submission of budget bids to 
the government by departments.  This involves 2-stage “ERC” process.  Department 
of Treasury and Finance usually issues a “Budget Memorandum” in September each 
year that outlines the ERC process for the forthcoming State Budget.12 
ERC Stage 1 (October - November) 
 The overall financial and policy strategy and direction is determined for the 
forthcoming Budget.  Key inputs to ERC Stage 1 include 
 Growing Victoria Together policy framework incorporating medium 
term outcomes, priority actions and progress measures 
 Submissions from Ministers on departmental and agency high-level 
strategic objectives based on information from corporate plans 
 Advice from the Treasurer on the aggregate Budget position and 
economic outlook, and on the strategic framework for managing major 
asset investment proposals 
 Information from other sources and stakeholders process 
ERC Stage 2 (December - March) 
In Stage 2, ERC considers submissions from Ministers containing proposals 
for new output and asset initiatives.  Key inputs include 
                                            
12 Victorian Government Public Sector Policy, Expenditure Review Committee, www.arts.vic.gov.au  
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 Ministerial submissions containing information on 
o medium-term departmental strategic performance issues and 
output statements 
o implementation plans for output/asset proposals consistent with 
the broad budget funding priorities agreed in Stage 1 
 Any additional submissions commissioned by ERC in Stage 1 
o implementation plans for non-priority emerging cost pressures 
o departmental and whole-of-government revenue, reprioritizations 
and/or savings options to increase budget capacity 
Based on the relative priority of proposed output and asset investment 
initiatives, Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) makes decisions about which 
outputs to purchase, for what price, and allocation of resources for new fixed asset 
investment projects.  These decisions are made in light of the Government’s broader 
social, economic, environmental and financial policy objectives and commitment to 
responsible financial management.  The decisions arising out of this process, subject 
to formal Cabinet approval, form the basis of the annual State Budget. 
The internal budget process starts with the requirement by departments to 
deliver outputs.  These are included in the departments’ corporate and business plans 
as service delivery targets and priorities.  Internal budgeting is affected by external 
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changes where, for example, parliamentary appropriations to purchase outputs are 
increased or reduced by government.13 
In 1998, the government of Victoria implemented a comprehensive, state 
wide Accrual Output Based Budgeting (AOBB) System.  This included the adoption 
of accrual based accounting and financial reporting and the implementation of a 
capital charging regime.14  The main characteristic of this system was the separation 
of the funder (government), the purchaser (portfolio ministers and departmental 
secretaries), and the provider (departments’ agencies or external bodies) roles.  
Moreover, central to the output management process from a financial management 
perspective was the conceptualization of linkages between funding, reporting and 
monitoring of defined outputs to government strategic priorities and outcomes. 
In summary, the lessons from the study of other countries best practices are 
[1] There is no specific model of performance-based budgeting and each country 
needs to adjust its approach to the relevant political and institutional circumstances.  
However, it is worthwhile to learn from the experience of other countries.  The 
review processes provide the opportunities for the decision-makers to select good 
practices to be replicated in Thailand and avoid potential pitfalls.  For examples,   
                                            
13 Australian National Audit Office, Internal Budgeting Better Practice Guide, February 2003 
14 Carlin M. Tyrone, Victoria's Accrual Output Based Budgeting System : Delivering as Promised?  
     Some Empirical Evidence, Macquarie University - Graduate School of Management, 2003 
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 Annual budgeting cannot be performed properly in isolation but has to 
be linked to planning, in the context of a multiyear framework.  The 
medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) encourages cooperation 
across ministries and planning over a longer horizon than the 
immediately upcoming fiscal year.  It is a tool to enhance stability, link 
budgets with the policy choices made, and improve outcomes by 
increasing transparency, accountability, and the predictability of 
funding. 
 Public Service Agreements (PSA) and Service Delivery Agreement 
(SDA) incorporate improved priority setting, information about 
performance, and incentive effects for public sector delivery and 
accountability through a system of performance targets.  However, it 
has been recognized that there are limitations to performance indicators 
capturing all relevant aspects dictating performance.  It is easier to 
devise and identify outputs rather than outcomes, which are more 
relevant to performance.   
 A program assessment rating tool (PART) review helps identify a 
program’s strengths and weaknesses to inform funding and 
management decisions aimed at making the program more effective.  
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However, many PART questions contain subjective terms that are open 
to interpretation.  Also, the yes/no format employed throughout most of 
the PART questionnaire resulted in oversimplified answers to some 
questions.  It was particularly troublesome for questions containing 
multiple criteria for a “yes” answer.  The further guidance is, therefore, 
necessary for a clear and consistent point of view. 
and [2] Budget reform is a journey, not a destination.  In some countries, it has taken 
several years to establish a government-wide performance management framework 
and they continue to make improvements.  In case of Thailand, the first step in the 
performance-based budgeting implementation has already been taken, but effective 
implementation of this framework is a long-term process.      
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Chapter III 
Background of Thai’s Budgeting System 
 
The Structure of Governance 
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, with the King as the Head of State.  The 
leader of the government is the Prime Minister, who presides over the Cabinet of 
Ministers.  The Thai Parliament is the supreme law-making authority, and consists of 
the Senate, whose members are elected for six-year terms, and the House of 
Representatives, whose members are elected for four-year terms.  The Cabinet 
consists of a 36 members – the Prime Minister and 35 other ministers.  A number of 
Deputy Prime Ministers are appointed for specific issues and areas (presently six).  
Smaller cabinet committees have been set up to screen and coordinate proposals 
before submission to the full cabinet in order to promote policy coherence across 
government.  The structure of governance is divided into national, provincial 
(changwat) and district levels, with the provinces headed by changwat governors and 
districts by district chiefs.  However, the city of Bangkok has its own governmental 
authority known as the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority. 
The Office of the Prime Minister is a central body, which in itself ranks as a 
ministry, whose responsibility is largely concerned with formulating national policy.  
Some of its primary subdivisions are the Bureau of the Budget, the National Security 
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Council, the Juridical Council, the National Economic and Social Development Board, 
the Board of Investment, the Civil Service Commission, the Office of Public Sector 
Development Commission, and several other organizations vital to the formulation of 
national policy. 
 Currently, the central government is organized around 20 ministries and 143 
departments.  All ministries are divided on a functional basis and all staffs are career 
civil servants.  The head of each ministry is the Permanent Secretary, who has 
administrative control over all the departments of the ministry – each of which is 
headed by a Director General.  Despite being hierarchically subordinate to their 
respective ministry, the departments have traditionally enjoyed a great deal of 
“separate identity” from their parent ministries. 
In addition to ministries and departments, two new types of government 
organizations have been created recently – [1] Autonomous Public Organizations 
(APO) which were created by transforming whole departments into the new 
organization form and [2] Service Delivery Units (SDU) which were created by 
transforming individual parts of departments.  These organizations could be 
understood as the Thai version of full-fledged “Executive Agencies” regardless of 
their names.15  They go beyond the organizational model of departments to embrace 
                                            
15 Jon R. Blondal and Sang in Kim, 2005 meeting of the OECD Asian Senior Budget Officials :  
     Budgeting in Thailand – A  review of Thai budgeting system, December 2005 
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increased managerial flexibility.  These units generally enjoy exemptions from the 
general central management rules in terms of budgeting and human resource 
management.  Examples include receiving lump-sum appropriations for their entire 
budget allocation and being able to hire staff on terms similar to those in private sector. 
The Bureau of the Budget (Royal Thai Government) 
The Bureau of the Budget (BOB) was established on February 14th, 1959 as a 
central agency in finance and budgeting system under the auspices of the Office of the 
Prime Minister.  The main responsibility is to allocate the budget for Royal Thai 
Government Agencies and State Owned Enterprises according to the Government 
Policies and the National Economic and Social Development Plan; and also acts as a 
management consultant to all government agencies.  Its primary functions are  
[1] Budget Preparation – Formulates budget allocation policy, prepares 
guidelines, and issues budget calendar for each fiscal year for line agencies to follow.  
Then, the Bureau of the Budget collects budget requests, analyzes and recommends 
the annual appropriations to the Prime minister and the cabinet. 
[2] Budget Adoption – Assists the government line agencies in articulating the 
budget to the parliament. 
[3] Budget Execution – After the budget bill becomes effective, the Bureau of 
the Budget oversees budget execution through comprehensive ex-ante, or input, 
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control mechanisms. 
[4] Budget Monitoring and Evaluation – Monitors and evaluates the 
performance of public expenditures to ensure consistency with the policies and 
objectives of the government on the basis of transparency, effectiveness, and 
efficiency.  
 [5] Policy Advice – Works closely with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), and the Bank of 
Thailand (BOT) in formulating the national fiscal policy.  Also, advices the cabinet 
and government line agencies for all issues that pertaining to budgeting and other 
actions that have budgetary impacts. 
The Bureau of the Budget is headed by a Budget Director with a total staff of 
approximately 900 officers.  Its organizational structure consists of 11 front offices as 
the core functions and 10 back offices.  Among front offices, the Budget Preparation 
Offices work closely with the government’s line agencies and state owned enterprises 
(SOE) under their responsibilities for the policy advice, budget preparation, budget 
adoption, and budget execution.  The total national budget is allocated to all line 
agencies at the Ministry’s department level.  The Evaluation Offices are responsible 
for the budget monitoring and evaluation while the other back offices support the core 
functions in both technical and administration terms.  The BOB’s organizational 
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structure is illustrated in figure 1 below 
Figure 1  :  The BOB’s organizational structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : The Bureau of the Budget, Thailand 
 
The Budgetary Procedure Act (B.E. 2502) 
In Thailand, the law concerning the preparation of budget is the revised of 
“Budgetary Procedure Act, B.E. 2502.”  Its important principles are 16  [1] To 
determine the time period of a fiscal year; [2] To determine the duties of the Minister 
of Finance and the Director of the Budget Bureau so as to be clear and appropriate for 
                                            
16 Law and Regulation Office, The Bureau of the Budget, Thailand 
“Front Offices” 
Deputy Director / Senior Advisor (11) 
Budget Director Internal Audit Office 
 Director (10) 
Evaluation Office 1,2 
Budget Policy Office 
Budget System Development Office 
Budget Strategy Center 
Standard Costing Office 
Budget Info System Office 
Law and Regulation Office 
Training Office 
General Admin Office 
 Director (11) 
National Security 
Budget Preparation Office 1,2 
General Administration 
Budget Preparation Office 
 Special Administrative Org. & SOE 
Social Development 
Budget Preparation Office 1,2,3 
Economic Development 
Budget Preparation Office 1,2,3,4 
 29
the new plan of the budgetary procedure; [3] To determine the essentials of the 
content of the budgetary documents so as to be taken as a standard form; [4] To 
determine the principle concerning the drawing and payment of money from the 
treasury, the keeping of money and the sending of money to the treasury so as to be 
more efficient; and [5] To determine the liability of the finance officials.  The details 
of the Budgetary Procedure Act, B.E. 2502 (1959) (amended) consist of 34 Sections 
(see Appendix). 
Annual Budgeting Process 
The fiscal year in Thailand is the period of time from the October 1st of one 
year to the September 30th of the following year.  The annual budgeting process can 
be divided into two phases:17   [1] Budget Preparation and [2] Budget Approval. 
 
Budget Preparation Timetable18 
 
  January -       “Gang of Four” prepare economic assumptions 
 February      Bureau of the Budget updates baseline projections 
        Spending ministries prepare and submit their initial budget bids 
 
  March        Aggregate budget ceilings established for individual ministries 
 
April        Spending ministries submit second budget bids – in line with     
                             their ceilings 
 
  May        Budget finalised and submitted to parliament 
 
                                            
17 Budget Strategy Center, Budget System Development Office, and Budget Policy Office –  
     The Bureau of the Budget, Thailand 
18 As applied for fiscal year 2006 budget. 
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The annual budget preparation process begins 10 months earlier, i.e. January.  
The first step is to determine the economic assumptions applicable for the budget.  
This is carried out jointly by four key central economic agencies, colloquially known 
as the “Gang of Four.”  These are the Bank of Thailand (central bank), the Ministry 
of Finance (taxation; cash and debt management), the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (macroeconomic analysis; central planning machinery) and the 
Bureau of the Budget.  The consensus forecast is submitted to the Prime Minister for 
final approval.  This should conclude in February.  At the same time, the Bureau of the 
Budget will be updating its baseline estimates (medium-term expenditure framework) 
for the continuation of current government policies.  This will involve a review of last 
year’s operational and financial performance with frequently informal contacts 
between analysts at the Bureau of the Budget and officials at spending ministries.  
However, the baseline forecast for out-years is not published; it is an internal Bureau 
of the Budget document only.  Parallel to this, spending ministries will be working on 
their budget submissions and submit their initial bids in February. 
Spending ministries submit these bids before the overall expenditure ceilings 
are decided.  These initial bids are generally wildly in excess of any realistic 
expectations of funding.  At this stage, the Bureau of the Budget is in a position to 
formulate the budget framework for the following year.  Based on the work of the 
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Gang of Four, the total resources available for next year’s budget will be known.  The 
update of the baselines for current activities will have been completed, thus revealing 
how much money is left for new initiatives.  The Bureau of the Budget will then 
propose expenditure ceilings for each ministry.  These will be submitted to the Prime 
Minister for approval.  Each minister is then required to submit a new spending 
request (second budget bid) by the end of April.   
Spending ministries are granted an aggregate ceiling which they can reallocate 
among their various programs and agencies – subject to final approval by the Bureau 
of the Budget.  The Bureau of the Budget evaluates each bid for new funding against 
three dimensions: 
 Is it in line with government priorities? 
 Is the agency making the bid the correct administrative unit to be 
carrying it out? 
 How does it contribute to empowering lower levels of government? 
In evaluating the bids, the Bureau of the Budget establishes an internal budget 
committee headed by the budget director and five internal sub-committees.  The sub-
committees reflect the organization of the Bureau into five analytical areas.  Each sub-
committee is headed by the respective deputy director responsible for that area.  
Following the review of the sub-committees, the internal budget committee reviews 
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their conclusions and makes any amendments and then submits them to the prime 
minister for his final approval.  The Cabinet then formally approves them. 
In addition, the Parliament also authorizes a comparatively large discretionary 
fund – the “Central Fund” – to the Prime Minister to meet new priorities during the 
year.  The use of this fund is prima facie a strong indication of the government’s 
priorities.  While about 80 percent of total government outlay is pre-determined in the 
budget formulation and approval phases, the other 20 percent is deposited in the 
central fund which can be operated as an in-year discretionary fund for specific 
purposes such as enhancing national’s competitiveness and sustainable development, 
emergency projects, etc.  This serves to create additional flexibility in budget 
implementation.   
 For the second phase – budget approval – the 1997 Constitution imposed time 
limits on how long the House of Representatives and the Senate have to consider the 
Budget.  In the case of the House, it is 105 days.  A general session of the House lasts 
120 days so this essentially means that the House has its entire session to deliberate 
the budget proposal.  The Senate has 20 days to finish its deliberations and make an 
up-or-down vote on the budget.  If either the House or the Senate has not finished the 
consideration of the budget within these periods, the budget is deemed to have been 
approved by them. 
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Budget Approval Timetable 
  
End May       Budget is introduced in the House of Representatives  
                               by the Prime Minister  –  First reading takes place immediately 
 
July-September    Scrutiny Committee on the Budget reviews government’s proposal
   
September       Informal negotiations between Government and Opposition on  
        amending the Budget 
        Second reading – votes on each individual amendment  
        to the budget  
        Third reading – up-or-down vote on the budget as a whole 
 
Late         Senate take one up-or-down vote on the budget as a whole  
September         following 2 day debate  
  
 
The parliamentary budget process starts with the Prime Minister introducing 
the government’s budget in the House of Representatives.  This generally occurs in 
May and usually follows the ceremony for the King’s annual convocation of the 
National Assembly.  Following the Prime Minister’s budget speech, the leaders of 
Opposition political parties counter with their different economic and social outlooks 
and how they would be reflected in the budget if they were in power. This is a 
“macro-debate” where different political philosophies are aired rather than any 
specifics of the budget.  Following this debate – which constitutes the First Reading 
of the budget – a vote is taken.  This is considered a vote-of-confidence in the 
government.  If the government were to lose this vote, the government would resign 
and a new election would be called.  If the vote is won, as is normally the case, a 
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“Scrutiny Committee” is selected to examine the government’s budget proposal.   
The Scrutiny Committee is an Ad Hoc committee which is formally selected 
anew each year.  The Committee is a joint Legislative-Executive Committee with the 
government nominating about one-fourth of the total 79 memberships and the 
Minister of Finance serves as the chairman.  The Committee normally divides into 
several sub-committees to address the different sectors of the budget.  During the sub-
committee’s meetings, the relevant Minister, the Permanent Secretary, and heads of 
subsidiary departments (agencies) appear.  The meetings are not open to the public. 
After that, the budget goes to a plenary session of the House of 
Representatives for its Second Reading.  For the budget, this is a technical session 
where all the amendments previously agreed informally by the government and the 
Opposition are made official.  An individual vote is taken on all the separate 
amendments.  The Second Reading normally occupies several full days.  Then, the 
final and Third Reading is a pro-forma event where an up-or-down vote is taken on 
the budget as a whole incorporating the amendments made during the Second Reading. 
Following its approval in the House of Representatives, the budget is 
transmitted to the Senate which can only make an up-or-down vote on the budget in 
total.  Once the House of Representatives an the Senate have approved the budget, it 
is submitted to His Majesty the King for Royal Assent.  Although it has always been 
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the case for the budget, Royal Assent is by no means automatic.  The Royals have a 
solid checks-and-balances role on government, on behalf of the people.  This is an 
informal aspect to the Thai parliamentary budget process. 
Highlight of the budget policy trends 
Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the Royal Thai Government has 
taken strong macroeconomic steps to stimulate the economy.  Fiscal policy is one of 
the most important tools for economic management.  Expansionary fiscal policy 
includes the usual budget deficits, foreign-financed spending, and tax burden 
reduction.  Table 1 shows the budget structure with an itemized breakdown of 
government revenues and expenditures. 
Table 1 : The latest 10-fiscal year budget structures (FY 1998 – FY 2007) 
Unit : Million Baht 
Budget Structure 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1. Expenditures 
 
830,000 825,000 860,000 910,000 1,023,000
     % of GDP 
 
17.1 17.2 17.1 17.9 18.9
   1.1 Current 
 
519,505.8 586,115.1 635,585.1 679,286.5 773,714.1
     % of total budget 
 
62.6 71.1 73.9 74.7 75.6
   1.2 Capital 
 
279,258.1 233,534.7 217,097.6 218,578.2 223,617
     % of total budget 
 
33.6 28.3 25.2 24.0 21.9
   1.3 Principle   
         Repayments 
 
31,236.1 5,350.2 7,317.3 12,135.3 25,668.9
     % of total budget 
 
3.8 0.6 0.9 1.3 2.5
2. Receipts 
 
830,000 825,000 860,000 910,000 1,023,000
   2.1 Revenues 
 
782,000 800,000 750,000 805,000 823,000
     % of GDP 
 
16.1 16.7 14.9 15.8 15.2
   2.2 Domestic   
         Borrowing 
 
48,000 25,000 110,000 105,000 200,000
     % of GDP 
 
1.0 0.5 2.2 2.1 3.7
GDP 
 
4,861,000 4,783,000 5,032,102 5,091,400 5,399,600
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Table 1  (Continued) 
Unit : Million Baht 
Budget Structure 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1. Expenditures  
 
999,900 1,163,500 1,250,000 1,360,000 1,566,200
     % of GDP 
 
17.0 18.0 17.5 17.4 18.5
   1.1 Current 
 
753,454.7 836,544.4 881,251.7 958,477 1,135,988.1
     % of total budget 
 
75.4 71.9 70.5 70.5 72.5
   1.2 Capital 
 
211,493.5 292,800.2 318,672 358,335.8 374,721.4
     % of total budget 
 
21.1 25.2 25.5 26.3 24.0
   1.3 Principle  
         Repayments 
 
34,951.8 34,155.4 50,076.3 43,187.2 55,490.5
     % of total budget 
 
3.5 2.9 4.0 3.2 3.5
2. Receipts 
 
999,900 1,163,500 1,250,000 1,360,000 1,566,200
   2.1 Revenues 
 
825,000 1,063,600 1,250,000 1,360,000 1,420,000
     % of GDP 
 
14.1 16.4 17.5 17.4 16.8
   2.2 Domestic  
         Borrowing 
 
174,900 99,900 - - 146,200
     % of GDP 
 
2.9 1.6 - - 1.7
GDP 
 
5,868,000 6,476,100 7,142,400 7,786,200 8,471,400
 
N.B.  Growth rates of GDP are at current market prices. 
Sources : (1) Bureau of the Budget  (2) Ministry of Finance 
 
According to table 1, several years of post-crisis deficit spending by the 
government in addition to the liabilities incurred in the international bailout program 
continue to weigh down the economy.  The government's annual budget deficit as a 
percent of GDP was a manageable 1.0% in 1998, and then soared to a peak 3.7% of 
GDP in 2002.  Fortunately, the government revenues have reached expected targets in 
2002 and the same trend of revenue was continued for the several following fiscal 
years.  Consequently, it allowed the government to be able to close the deficit gap and 
adopt the balanced budget policy in fiscal year 2005 – 2006.  However, Thai 
government (interim government from the military coup in September 2006) has 
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made a decision to run the budget deficit again in fiscal year 2007 with an intention to 
keep the country’s economic growth and reflect the government’s actual spending 
costs.19  The government would still focus on maintaining the fiscal discipline and 
economic stability for the budget management by adopting the sufficiency economy 
philosophy to manage the spending budget.  It would adhere to the transparent, fair, 
saving, efficient and balanced approaches to developing the country's social, 
economic, natural resource and environment affairs.20      
In addition, for the expenditure side, it can be classified into five objects of 
expenditure – personnel, operating, investment, subsidies, and other.  The available 
funds from national budget sources mostly spent for the personnel expenses and least 
for the investment and operating (as shown in Figure 2).  Therefore, in order to make 
the budget allocation harmonious and responsive to the government’s policy of 
maximizing benefits from the budget expenditures, Thailand needed a strong effort to 
control the amount of current expenditure and manage the remaining funds with 
efficiency, productivity and cost-effectiveness. 
                                            
19 Budget in Brief 2007, The Bureau of the Budget, Thailand 
20 Speech of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, Thailand Board of Investment press releases, 2007 
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Figure 2 : Budget appropriation by objects of expenses (FY 1998 – FY 2007) 
 
 
N.B. 
Personnel expenses  
Expenses on personnel administration in public sector, e.g. salaries, permanent wages, 
temporary wages, and wages for employees under contracts. 
Operating expenses  
Expenses on administration and operations, e.g. remuneration, services other than personnel 
and supplies, public utilities 
Investments  
Expenses on equipments, land, buildings and related expenses 
Subsidies  
Expenses on support for operations of local administrative organizations, private 
organizations and other juristic persons. These expenses are classified as personnel expenses, 
operating expenses and investments. 
Other expenses  
Expenses that cannot be classified by the above categories or expenses that Bureau of the 
Budget specifies to be made from this account. These expenses are also classified as 
personnel expenses, operating expenses and investments. 
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Chapter IV 
Analysis of Budgeting System Reform in Thailand 
 
Budgeting System in former years 
Thai’s budgeting system has undergone continuous development since the 
early 1980s.  The country replaced its first budgeting system, Line-item or Input-
Based, with Planning-Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1982, and again 
transformed the PPBS with the current budgeting system known as Strategic 
Performance Based Budgeting System (SPBB) in 2003.  When- Why- and How did 
these reforms happen are analyzed and discussed as follow; 
 Line-item (Input-Based) Budgeting System 
Thailand budgeting system has been traditionally highly centralized.  In the 
first stages of the Budget Bureau’s establishment (1959), the State Administration 
structure was not as complicated as today.  Moreover, the aggregate budget ceiling 
was not large, and the structure of government functions were less complicated.  The 
early stage of budgeting, therefore, focused on the details of expenditures.  This 
system is known as Input-Based budgeting, also widely known as the Line-item 
budgeting system.  The system process focused on the documentation and subsequent 
control of the amounts of resources earmarked for various activities.  It generates an 
itemized and proportioned plan for budget spending.      
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Under this system, the budgeting practice is based on bottom-up bidding and 
bargaining for funds between department heads and the Bureau of the Budget.  The 
Bureau of the Budget (BOB) controls each agency’s spending in detail through 
numerous separate budget allocations (detailed line itemizing).  Each agency is 
subject to further BOB controls through the four monthly funds allotment process.  To 
help resolve the tension between line item detail and operational flexibility, line 
agencies can transfer funds between their detailed budget lines.  However transfer 
arrangements are complex and rely heavily on BOB approval, contributing to line 
agencies chronically under-spending their budget allocations by the end of the budget 
year.   
Although the detailed central control helped avoid over-spending and distorted 
spending of the agencies, it also impedes government effort to achieve the best value 
for money.  The reason is because BOB based budget allocations on historical 
precedents with little or no reference to the results of the spending, and made 
incremental (or decremental) changes to last year’s allocations in response to newly 
emerging policy priorities.  Agencies were then have little incentive to develop the 
accounting and budgeting capacity to allocate funds more effectively or to deliver 
outputs using fewer resources because they assumed little responsibility for how 
funds are spent, instead tried to focus on increasing their historical funding level. 
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 Planning-Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) 
Due to the failure of Thai budgeting system to promote efficiency spending 
and value for money, the government therefore has made several attempts to introduce 
more results focused budgeting.  The earliest was the introduction of program 
budgeting when the oil price crisis in the early 1980’s began to place pressure on Thai 
public finances. 
In 1982, the Bureau of the Budget designed the Planning-Programming 
Budgeting System (PPBS) to replace the Line-item Budgeting System.  Under PPBS, 
the budgetary process was improved in many ways.  The improvements include; [1] 
Preparing and evaluating budget expenditures by sectors; [2] Emphasizing program 
output, evaluation, planning and economic analysis functions; [3] Reducing central 
budget control and giving greater delegation of authority to departments to manage 
their plans and projects; and [4] Using computer facilities to automate routine 
allotments.  This new system create a stronger link between agency allocations and 
the government’s policy objectives than under traditional Line-item budgeting.  It 
enables the level of spending for each policy objective to be tracked for budget 
prioritization and control.  Moreover, the physical consequences of budget spending 
in each program were reported to a newly created Evaluation Office in BOB in order 
to assess their cost effectiveness. 
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At the beginning of reform, PPBS was not fully practicing.  It appears that 
BOB was reluctant to use ex post output information available from its Evaluation 
Office for budget tracking and control.  Rather than funds being allocated to agencies 
in program blocks, detailed line itemization continued as the basis for budget 
allocation and tracking in parallel with the new PPBS framework.  Until 1997, the 
government again was forced to accelerate its budget reform by the economic crisis 
and the passage of the new Constitution.  Consequently, in 1999, “Financial and 
Performance Management Standards” has been used as a major tool to relieve 
detailed centralized controls over line agencies.  The standards involved seven 
management criteria, known as “7 Hurdles”, that line agency needs to meet to 
substitute for external, centralized controls.  External controls can then be loosened 
with less risk of wasted resources and greater chance of attaining better outcomes 
from government spending.  The seven hurdles include 
 [1] Planning process – is to define long-term government targets, agency 
mission and service delivery plans to be consistent with government policies and 
strategies.  This process requires both top-down and bottom-up medium term 
expenditures framework. 
[2] Costing and Output Specification – are methodologies to assist 
government agencies in defining agency outputs, cost effectiveness and value for 
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money for government services.  They are also critical for proper prioritization of 
scarce resources. 
[3] Financial and Performance Reporting – is the mechanism critical to 
establishing a tangible accountability system.  The performance information should be 
accurately reported and fed back into resource allocation process.    
[4] Financial Management and Fund Control – is to ensure prudent, legal, and 
efficient utilization of funds in accordance with the intent of budget bill as approved 
by the Parliament. 
[5] Procurement Management – is to enforce a transparent, effective and 
efficient procurement process.  It is critical to achieve long-term cost effectiveness 
and operational flexibility.  
[6] Asset Management – is to maximize asset utilization and to ensure 
operational efficiency.     Proper asset maintenance increases asset productivity and 
long-term return on asset.  
[7] Internal Auditing – is critical to financial devolution.  Decreased central 
control must be replaced by strong internal control mechanisms by agencies. 
 The Bureau of the Budget offers to ease central controls led to quasi-
contractual arrangements between the bureau and six pioneer agencies set out in 
signed memorandums of understanding.  These agreements committed the pioneer 
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agencies into management upgrades intended to fill gaps in the seven hurdle areas.  
The agreements also committed the Bureau to reducing central controls once the 
hurdles are cleared to its satisfaction.  Once an agency met the hurdles, a resource 
agreement with the Bureau of the Budget was intended to formalize the agency’s 
more devolved budget arrangements.  The timing of the agreement depends on the 
time the agency takes to fill the gaps in the hurdle areas. 21 
To start a reform, the Bureau of the Budget assigned each pioneer agency a 
sector expert from a foreign government agency (mostly from Australia and New 
Zealand) that had introduced similar decentralized management.  Thus, the 
consultants’ experience with introducing modern agency management systems was 
both hands-on and sector-specific.22  Each expert prepared a report identifying gaps in 
their assigned agency for the seven hurdle areas, together with strategies for filling the 
gaps.  The reports gave the agencies a feel for the size of their gap-filling tasks and 
helped the Bureau of the Budget understand the hurdle standards to be achieved 
before easing central controls.  Subsequently, a group of experts developed 
management system standards for the seven hurdles and the Bureau of the Budget 
consolidated the reports into a manual on budget reform. 
                                            
21 Geoffrey Dixon, The World Bank : Thailand’s hurdle approach to budget reform, PREM Notes 
     No. 73, page 2, August 2002    
22 Budget System Development Office – The Bureau of the Budget, Thailand 
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 However, slow progress did prove to be a problem for this reform.  The 
original hurdle approach was too complex.  Seven hurdles were too many for the 
initial stage of reform.  There was much confusion in pioneer agencies over what was 
required to achieve hurdle standards, reflecting overly ambitious standards and 
aggravated by limited technical assistance for budget reform.    Moreover, inputs from 
international consultants were not integrated with budget reform efforts.  Some 
consultants focused on later-stage reforms, such as introducing accrual budgeting, 
rather than on the immediate need for basic financial management systems in line 
agencies.  In 2001, the Bureau of the Budget finally eased central controls on the six 
pioneer agencies by reducing some line-item details in their budget allocations and 
moving toward block grants, although no agencies had completely met the standards.  
Consequently, the block grants allocation ran into trouble because agency accounting 
systems were not able to meet required financial accountability standards. 
Current Budgeting System 
When it had become clear that PPBS failed to work effectively, the second 
round of Thai’s budgeting reform in order to attempt more for a result focused 
budgeting was occurred.  In February 2001, the government announced a plan to 
expedite budget reform process which aimed that budgeting becomes an effective and 
efficient tool for translating policies into tangible results, while empowering ministers, 
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ministries and departments to manage with greater accountability and transparency 
coupled with comprehensive performance monitoring and evaluation system.  Since 
then, the focus of the reforms has shifted from the application of technical 
management tools to a concern for the implementation of the strategic goals of the 
government.  In particular, there was a shift in emphasis from the application of the 
technical tools for financial and performance management standards – 7 hurdles – to 
“Strategic Performance Based Budgeting” by linking the government’s processes for 
setting government policy goals to the budget processes. 
 Strategic Performance Based Budgeting System (SPBB) 
In 2003, the Bureau of the Budget has improved and developed the Strategic 
Performance Based Budgeting System (SPBB) by taking into account the national 
target, the devolution of power in decision making, planning, implementing and 
executing the budget to ministries and agencies under a clear administration structure 
and accountability, aiming of a better utilization of the budget.  Moreover, the prime 
minister asked the Bureau of the Budget to present the budget for fiscal 2003 on an 
output basis, effectively requiring that the second hurdle – costing and output 
specification – be achieved by all agencies.  To do so, the Bureau has identified 66 
new output-oriented programs and 300 associated output groups and asked the 
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agencies to identify their outputs within this framework.23  The budgeting system 
placed more emphasis on the importance of results, in the forms of both outputs and 
outcomes.  This initiative requires all government agencies to set objectives and 
determine clear work processes which are assessable and to make budget allocation 
more responsive to the people’s needs in a tangible way. 
“The Key Principles” of the SPBB includes  
 Policy driven with strategic allocation : translate government policy 
into action; government agencies are worked with clear missions and strategies and 
verifiable performance indicators  
 Forward looking : both financial and performance expectation are to be 
forecasted over the medium-term (current budget year plus three forward estimated 
years) to acknowledge the obligations of present policies 
 De-concentration : ministers are to be empowered to manage budgeting 
affairs with greater autonomy and be held accountable for results, so that they will 
have freedom to execute budgets and take accountability for their own actions 
 Comprehensive coverage : all fiscal activities and risks are to be 
accounted for and included in fiscal and budget policy formulation 
 Good Governance : transparency and clear accountability of all parties 
                                            
23 Geoffrey Dixon, The World Bank : Thailand’s hurdle approach to budget reform, PREM Notes 
     No. 73, page 3, August 2002    
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in the system; comprehensive, accurate, and timely financial and performance reports 
are to be made available to the cabinet, parliament and the people 
The “Accountability and Structure” of the SPBB is illustrated in figure 2.  
The accountability is divided into three levels which are government, ministry, and 
agency. 
At first, the cabinet or its agent will develop the top level targets – strategic 
targets – to signal clear government priorities.  The strategic targets are developed 
from the government policy, five-year national economic and social development plan, 
and the constitution.  These targets are to span four years matching the term of the 
government.  They must be explicit and prioritized so that they can drive budget 
allocation.  In any case, the achievement of these strategic targets becomes the 
responsibility of the government as a whole.  Ministers, then, take these strategic 
targets with their own ministry and departments missions and develop ministry 
service delivery targets.  Again, these targets must also span for four years.  The 
achievement of these ministry targets falls on the minister.  Once ministry targets are 
set, agencies must decide on their output mix that is consistent with the achievement 
of the ministry targets.  The accountability at this level falls on the director generals of 
agencies for the production of outputs at the agreed cost, quantity, quality, and 
timeliness.  Cost is calculated for the outputs, and this is where budgeting occurs. 
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Figure 3 :  Accountability and Structure of SPBB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : The Bureau of the Budget, Thailand 
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Performance indicators are to be developed for all levels.  Monitoring and 
Evaluation of outputs and outcomes at all levels are integral to the budget process and 
must be conducted on a continuous basis and must feed back into the budget planning 
and preparation process for subsequent years.  In addition, the figure also 
demonstrates the scope of the Public Service Agreement (PSA) and Service Delivery 
Agreement (SDA) which will make, if fully implemented, the accountability for the 
achievement of all levels more explicit. 
Many “Techniques & Tools”, learned from the experiences and best practices 
of other countries, have been introduced and applied for supporting this second round 
budget system reform.  The core processes of reforming can be analyzed as follow; 
[1]  Translate policies into action (policy driven with strategic allocation) by 
 Applied the medium term (4-year) fiscal planning and priority setting 
– the Medium Expenditure Framework (MTEF) – with both top-down and bottom-
up projections.  The “Top-down” projection is a rolling four years macro fiscal 
projection, taking consideration various economic assumptions and the government’s 
fiscal policy target.  The overall expenditure ceiling is set through a top-down 
approach.  With this scheme in place the government can plan its fiscal outcome target, 
such as level of surplus or deficit over the medium term.  The “Bottom-up” MTEF is 
the baseline projection of government expenditures given that no new policies are 
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implemented over the projection horizon.  This is calculated from department level 
information, and represents the minimum cost of continuing operation.  This will also 
help line agencies to better plan their operation as they have some knowledge of 
funding availability over the medium term.  Collectively, the top-down and bottom-up 
MTEF will provide the government with necessary information to better align 
available resources with planned expenditures, and contribute greatly to prudent fiscal 
policy formulation and fiscal discipline. 
 Developed the Strategic Dimension – Function, Area, and Agenda. 
The system of planning and targets are integrated and linked from national level down 
to operational level.  Public policies are run in three dimensions “Function Based”, 
“Area Based”, and “Agenda Based” simultaneously to effectively drive key policies, 
provide public services, and enhance area specific competitive advantages. 
The budget allocation plans are also followed these strategic 
dimensions.  First is by “Function” or by ministries and departments which includes 
both essential and strategic services with everything consistent with government 
policy and budget allocation policy and in accordance with their legal prerogatives.  
Second is by “Area” for provinces, provincial clusters and agencies operating 
overseas.  Third is by “Agenda” or a special issue that the government stresses.  This 
cuts across ministries and agencies that involve close cooperation between them but 
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with clear agenda sponsor or champion and supporting ministries and agencies.  One 
element in this third dimension was a pot of money called the “Central Fund” 
allocated solely at the Prime Minister’s discretion (although requiring cabinet 
endorsement). 
 Developed the Outcome/Output Structure.  To present the budget on 
an output basis requires all government agencies to define their outputs.  They must 
attempt to separate the outputs (results) from the activities (processes) and also define 
the outcomes (consequences of the results) as shown below in figure 4. 
Figure 4 :  The Outcome/Output Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
        
 
 
 
 
Source : Budget System Development Office, The Bureau of the Budget, Thailand 
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The outcomes, as specified by government, are achieved through the 
combined impact of departmental outputs and the government administered items 
(generally programs).  The output must be quantifiable and related to outcomes under 
the national strategic target.  Efficiency output indicators are generated by agencies to 
monitor the performance of their output delivery by measuring the quality, quantity, 
timeliness, and cost of delivering each output.  These indicators are an important part 
of agencies’ performance reporting to external stakeholders, such as parliament and 
the community, via such documents as Portfolio Budget Statements and agency 
annual reports.  Besides, effectiveness outcome indicators and any changes in external 
or environmental phenomena that may effect achievement of a particular outcome, 
both in broad terms and in term of specific impacts, are also be tracked and reported 
at the outcome level.  These indicators, therefore, provide feedback to help 
government agencies learning and redesign of the component outputs and/or activities 
to better achieve the specified outcomes.  In addition, effective budget allocations 
which is in accordance with national strategies and in full support of government 
policies are ensured by these linkages of plan and targets. 
[2]  Empower the agencies with greater accountability and transparency by 
 Engaged the agencies with the performance agreement – Public 
Service Agreement (PSA) and Service Delivery Agreement (SDA).   The performance 
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of portfolio ministers is measured against the PSAs, while departmental heads are 
held to account for the SDAs.  These agreements somewhat formalize the promise of 
managerial accountability although they are not yet fully enforced. 
For ministry level, PSA is signed between a portfolio minister(s) and 
the Prime Minister or his/her agent.  PSA links ministry service delivery targets with 
government strategic targets, and holds ministers accountable for achievement of 
agreed outcomes.  The agreement contains government level strategic targets, 
ministry service delivery targets, indicators, indicative budget, and responsible 
minister(s).  PSA can be single ministry or multi-ministry in nature, in instances when 
achievement of outcome depends on cooperation of many ministries – such as tourism, 
Aids prevention, or poverty alleviation.  In this case, all responsible ministers are 
included in the PSA which should serve to facilitate closer cooperation towards 
common targets.  However, the PSAs are not signed for the whole of government, and 
hence will not cover the entire budget.  They are signed only for ministries or 
functions that the government wants to emphasize.   
For department level, SDA is signed between the Director Generals of 
agencies and the portfolio minister.  SDA links agency outputs with ministry service 
delivery targets, and holds Director Generals accountable for the achievement of 
outputs at the agreed cost, quantity, quality, and timeliness.  The agreement contains 
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the ministry delivery targets and agency outputs, budget, indicators, and responsible 
officials.  The SDAs are signed with every department, and hence collectively will 
cover the entire budget accounting for all government outputs.   
 Increased flexibilities to operate budget for all ministries and 
provincials.  BOB loosed some regulations that would allow the agencies (1) to make 
change or to transfer funds within the same categories under the same program (not 
affect the output targets or the core objective of the budget), and (2) to manage 
remaining budget between and among operations items/activities (not tie up with the 
future budget/ not for unplanned overseas trips or costly durable article/ building/ 
land).  However, all the change and transfer issues would be informed to the BOB.   
In addition, under the 1999 Decentralization Act,24  the BOB must 
allocate funds to local government organizations (provincials) with at least 35 
percents of national public revenue by the year 2006 (increased from 20-percent in 
2001 and 8-percent in 1999).  These funds will be allocated as a block grants subsidy 
toward each provincial with the appropriate amount setting by Office of the 
Decentralization to Local Government Organization Committee (DLOC).  
 Developed the Budget Information System (BIS) prototyped which 
initially will be an in-house system.  The key concepts are shown in figure 5. 
                                            
24 Office of the Decentralization to Local Government Organization Committee, www.dloc.opm.go.th  
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Figure 5 :  Key Concepts of Budget Information System Prototyped  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Budget Information System Office, The Bureau of the Budget, Thailand 
 
Currently, some functional can be used for supporting the budget 
processes, but still a lot more to develop.  Finally, if fully developed, BOB has 
planned to integrate it with public sector platform (Government Financial 
Management Information System: GFMIS) in order to enhance accessibility for users 
and increase transparency overall. 
[3]  Create comprehensive performance monitoring and evaluation system by 
 Implemented the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART).  
Using the United States’ Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) as a prototype 
model, the Bureau of the Budget adopted its own Performance Assessment Rating 
Key            
BIS Prototyped 
Concepts 
 
Output 
Specification
Distribution 
of Agency 
output cost 
to Govt. 
targets and 
“Essential 
Services” 
PSA, SDA and 
Strategic 
Linkage 
MTEF  
Bottom-up 
Budget 
Classification 
Extended budget 
coverage to cover 
total output cost 
Functional Cost 
Center & Output 
Costing 
Budget Planning 
MTEF Top-down 
Budget Ceiling 
Distribution 
Executive 
Information 
System 
 57
Tool (PART) system which included a set of 30 questions covering 5 dimensions – 
purpose and design of the project, the strategic planning, the management structure 
and capability, the resource management, and the results of the project.   
Figure 6 :  The Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
              Source : Evaluation Office, The Bureau of the Budget, Thailand 
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Initiated in 2004 with a number of pilot projects, the use of PART is now expanded to 
cover 40 agencies in 20 ministries.   
“Problems and Obstacles” 
As mentioned before, because of a keen interest in upgrading the 
management of the public budgeting and dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the 
‘hurdles’ approach, Thai’s government decided that all ministries and agencies would 
move to the new performance and results budgeting system – Strategic Performance 
Based Budgeting System (SPBB) – which became effective in the fiscal year 2003.  
Consequently, there was concern voiced that this universal move was too rapid and 
that some ministries and agencies were not up to the task.    
Although the Bureau of the Budget has improved and developed various 
techniques and tools for supporting the SPBB, the reform still be far to reach its aims.  
According to the study and analysis through literature review and BOB 
executives/staffs interview, the reform was already on the right track with mostly 
appropriate techniques and tools.  However, there are two main causes that slowing 
down this mission which are insufficient competency and incomplete cooperation.    
[1]  Insufficient Competency – the rapid and comprehensive budget system 
reform has strongly effected both government agencies and BOB in order to prepare/ 
improve their resources/capacity and take immediately respond for the changes.  
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Therefore, the most severe problems for some government agencies included  
 Failed to translate the national policies into action – agencies face the 
difficulty to develop and link their service delivery plans/targets and performance 
measures with the government strategic targets, to define outputs (strategic vs. regular 
and/or output vs. activity) which are consistent with the achievement of ministry 
service delivery targets, and to set the appropriate performance indicators (especially 
in terms of quality and cost).  Moreover, some agencies are unable to estimate the 
medium-term expenditure due to an inadequate experience and information.  Thus, by 
sending the unreal data to BOB, it wasted times for screening and correcting before 
these bottom-up data can be used together with the top-down projections.  
 Failed to manage the block grants effectively – local government 
organizations (provincials) are found to be unable to operate and manage their block 
grant subsidies in terms of result based.  According to the BOB monitoring and 
evaluation reports, most of provincials’ performances are below the standard.  The 
spending was inappropriate, unworthy (over spending), and even could not reach their 
output targets.  Besides, based on the Office of the Auditor General’s reports, some 
provincials’ budget operating processes are not transparency.  Many projects and 
activities seem to be involved with the corruptions which are now under the processes 
of examination.  
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For the BOB, the severe problems due to an insufficient competency are 
 Unable to provide professional advices for agencies – the SPBB 
reform concepts including techniques/ tools are developed by the back offices (budget 
policy office, budget system development office, and budget strategy center, etc.) and 
then shared the final knowledge with the front offices (budget preparation office) for 
implementation.  Consequently, front offices usually denied giving advices to their 
responsible agencies due to their unclear knowledge.  The back offices, on the other 
hand, can handle better in theoretical ways but could not clearly adapt for the real 
cases.  Finally, the agencies still lose the way to solve their critical problems and 
could not drive the reform with fully efforts.   
 Imperfect performance measurement – some evaluation reports are 
inaccurate (agencies over-grade themselves in self-assessment report/ BOB evaluation 
staffs prepare reports based on their judgements without site-visiting) or incomplete 
(annual report for long-term projects/outputs), so that these become useless 
information which could not support any further decision-making processes.                      
Moreover, measuring some indicators – especially at the outcome level or in term of 
quality measure – seems to be too difficult for BOB.  These are costly, time 
consuming, and no assurance of success.  And in case of setting mismatch indicators, 
which sometimes happened, could mislead the measurement results. 
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[2] Incomplete Cooperation – among the budgeting reform participants and 
stakeholders (government agencies, BOB, and political sector), considering to keep or 
discard the reform rules depends on the circumstance or significant benefit/ loss.  
 Government agencies, in the budget execution process, have no 
incentive to take strong efforts to produce all outputs stated in their agreement (Public 
Service Agreement or Service Delivery Agreement).  There are no worthy rewards or 
severe penalties in case of success or failure.  The agreements, therefore, are the same 
as general documents for some agencies.  Moreover, in case of a multi-ministry PSA, 
the result is worst because of lacking co-operation and communication between the 
host (main responsible ministry) and the supporting ministries for running the tasks. 
 The Bureau of the Budget (BOB), in the budget planning/ preparation 
process, sometimes has to irrationally cut-down some total amount of agencies’ 
budget in order to meet the overall ceiling.  This does cause the agencies difficulty to 
re-arrange their strategic plans (change- decrease- or cancel projects/ outputs/ 
activities/ indicators) which could possible affect the national outcomes as well. 
 Political Sector (Parliamentarian), in the budget approval process, has 
not embraced the performance and results orientation of the budget with parliament’s 
deliberations generally focused on inputs.  This does pose a challenge to the effective 
sustainability of the outcomes and outputs framework. 
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 In addition, another important obstacle is the national political situation.  Since 
the military coup in September 2006, the nation’s public tasks are now run by the 
interim government.  The draft budget procedure act which has been adjusted in order 
to support the current budgeting system is pending for the cabinet approval.  Some 
significant techniques and tools such as PSA, SDA, and empowerment/ decentralize 
management, therefore, can not formally and legally be used as well. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
Conclusion  
Today, when the management of money is more important than ever, 
budgeting system plays an enormous role in controlling operations efficiently and 
effectively.  Although there is not any unique system likely to be applicable to all 
countries, a good system for managing budget should be able to produce 
complementary performance outcomes of fiscal discipline and sustainability, effective 
allocation of budgetary resources according to policy priorities, and operational 
efficiency in executing public expenditure programs. 
 In Thailand’s history, the failure of the budgeting system to focus on the 
results of government spending has concerned successive governments since the early 
1980s and Thai’s government has made several attempts to introduce more results 
focused budgeting.  The Planning-Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) which 
creates a stronger link between agency allocations and the government’s policy 
objectives was introduced in 1982 to replace the traditional Line-item (Input-Based) 
Budgeting System.  This enabled the level of spending for each policy objective to be 
tracked for budget prioritization and control.  However, program budgeting failed to 
work effectively in Thailand.  The current budgeting system, “Strategic Performance 
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Based Budgeting System” (SPBB), then, was introduced in 2003.  This is a large step 
forward for Thai’s budget system reform.  The SPBB is mainly focused on reforming 
budget preparation by creating more formal links between budget allocations to 
agencies and government strategy.  Such reforms are expected to transform Thai 
budget processes from highly centralized, inflexible, and distortedly practices to a 
system where the public purse commands performance from line ministries.  The 
devolution of budget management to ministries and agencies was accompanied by 
greater accountability – through strategic controls, performance contracts, and greater 
transparency of results.  Moreover, the Bureau of the Budget has studied international 
best practice and has adapted many ideas to suit the unique Thai cultural and socio-
economic tradition. And hence, new techniques/ tools – such as medium term 
expenditure framework, outcome/output structure, public service agreements, 
performance assessment rating tool, etc. – have been developed for supporting the 
achievement of this particular budgeting system.  In this method, the entire planning 
and budgeting framework is result (output/outcome) oriented.   
However, comparing with a private sector, the budgeting system of public 
sector is cumbersome.  It needs to go through many processes before moving into the 
budget execution phase and post-execution analyses; furthermore, the entire process 
involves the collaboration of different bodies throughout the government.  This 
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collaboration is not only for budget preparation, negotiation and approval processes, 
but also for the spending approval after the whole budget allocation is finalized.  
Consequently, these really created many problems and obstacles for the reform.  
According to this study, it can be argued that only a great reform implementation plan 
with appropriate supporting technical/tools is not enough.  Besides, in order to 
accomplish the ultimate reform goals, Thai’s government needs to concern more 
about the compliance and response from all participants and stakeholders toward the 
overall reform processes. 
Lessons Learned 
While Thailand’s quest for “Results-based” budgeting system reform is still a 
long way from success, experience to date suggests many key lessons which are 
 [1]  Reforms, especially a comprehensive type, should be launched gradually, 
in line with capacity.  The detailed design of change is also important.  It needs the 
institutional mechanisms that provide clear guidance on rules, processes and 
procedures, roles and responsibilities that support reform formulation and 
implementation. 
 [2]  Policy legitimization is crucial, especially in a bureaucratic culture that 
values rules and regulations.  The government is to be commended by drafting the 
necessary legislations to support the reform effort.  This does help for building 
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awareness and consensus to establish the reform to all participants and stakeholders. 
 [3]  Strong executive command and support is necessary.  There are some 
bureaucratic stakeholders (including the Bureau of the Budget) and even politicians 
who are adversely affected by reform.  Many incur costs – loss of power or other 
benefits, and face the effort required to understand new systems documented in a 
different language and in which traditional control points disappear.25  Therefore, 
reform of this magnitude is not possible without clear “political” direction and 
support as a whole.  Political pressure is required on both Budget Bureau and line 
agencies to maintain reform momentum.   
 [4]  Leadership and co-ordination are critical.  Participants and stakeholders 
must accept the principles of reform, and must be consulted as equal partners during 
implementation.  One agency cannot reform an entire bureaucratic system.  High-
level leadership across several complementary and mutually reinforcing areas is 
required.  This leadership must extend from the top of the bureaucracy to empower 
change agents below.  Leaders must ensure that reform is comprehensive, integrated, 
and coordinated across agencies.  The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, for 
example, will require coordinated effort from the BOB, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Bank of Thailand, and the National Economic and Social Development Board. 
                                            
25 Bowornwathana B., Governance Reform in Thailand : Questionable Assumptions, Uncertain  
    Outcomes., An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 13, No. 3, July 2000 
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 [5]  Incentives are important when reforms are implemented.  The effect on 
the overall incentive framework, and available capacity, should determine the 
substance and speed of reform efforts.  However, only rules that can be enforced and 
institutions that will matter should be introduced.  A demonstration of early gains 
(rewards) or losses (penalties) is important to generate and reinforce the will to 
implement reforms and to keep minds focused. 
 [6]  Robust reforms evolve in unexpected ways.  They require sustained effort 
over time, with attention paid to proper sequencing.  Consequently, implementation 
strategies must be accompanied by careful monitoring of whether objectives are being 
met, as well as flexibility in feeding back what is learned on the ground to enhance 
the reform’s effectiveness.26      
 [7]  There is no such a unique budgeting system that can be fit for all countries.  
Each country has different socio-economic and cultural traditions.  While 
international best practices around the world provide invaluable sources of inspiration, 
the countries must carefully adapt them to the current local conditions.   Besides, 
hosting or attending the international conferences/ forums which provided the related 
topics of the reform – such as the OECD Asian Senior Budget Officials Meeting – can 
upgrade the knowledge with clearer and broader perspectives. 
                                            
26 Dana Weist, Dr., Reflections on Thailand’s Budget Reform, The Bureau of the Budget Year Book,  
     p. 192-194, March 2003 
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 In addition, there is an interesting issue to keep in mind about How would 
“success” in Strategic Performance Based Budgeting be defined?  In attempting to 
link resources to results, simply to increase the supply of performance information is 
not enough.  Performance problems may well prompt budget cuts or program 
eliminations, but they may also inspire enhanced investments and reforms in program 
design and management if the program is deemed to be of sufficiently high priority to 
the nation.  Conversely, even a program that is found to be exceeding its performance 
expectations can be a candidate for budgetary cuts if it is a lower priority than other 
competing claims in the process.  The success of performance budgeting, therefore, 
cannot be measured merely by the number of programs “killed” or a measurement of 
funding changes against performance “grades.”  Rather, success must be measured in 
terms of the quality of the discussion, the transparency of the information, the 
meaningfulness of that information to key stakeholders, and how it is used in the 
decision-making process.27 
Recommendations for Assuring Success 
According to the problems/ obstacles and lessons learned from the budgeting 
system reform, Thailand needs to implement the Public Expenditure Management/ 
Review (PEM/R) and ascertain that it becomes standard operating procedure in the 
                                            
27 David M. Walker, Performance Budgeting : Opportunities and Challenges, Comptroller General –  
     United States General Accounting Office, September 2002 
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budgetary process.  The World Bank’s PEM handbook argues that improvements in 
PEM require28 
 A greater focus on performance - the results achieved with expenditure.   
This has the potential to engage all stakeholders in pursuit of budgetary and financial 
management reform. 
 Adequate links between policy making, planning and budgeting.  This is 
essential to sustainable improvements in all dimensions of budgetary outcomes. 
 Well-functioning accounting and financial management systems.  These 
are among the basics that underpin governmental capacity to allocate and use 
resources efficiently and effectively. 
 Attention to the links between budgeting and financial management 
systems and other service-wide systems and processes of government – for decision 
making, organizing government, and personnel management.  Well-performing public 
sector requires that all component parts work well and, where appropriate, together. 
Thai government, therefore, can start from reviewing all techniques, tools, 
human capabilities, and other supporting resources at the Bureau of the Budget and 
line ministries/agencies.  Then, continue to improve the country’s PEM by29 
                                            
28 The World Bank, Public Expenditure Management Handbook, June 1998 
29 The Bureau of the Budget, Public Expenditure Management/ Review (PEM/R) in Thailand, 
     December 2006 
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 Increasing fiscal inter-relationship among government agencies in all 
levels 
 Increasing roles of government agencies concerning Public Expenditure 
Management/ Review (PEM/R) 
 Refining design and structure of all PEM components and move forward 
with the clear step-by-step operational plan for each PEM component   
 Developing institutional capacity – including a comprehensive strategy 
for specific staff training linked to phased operational plan – and effective system 
support programs 
The core objective for performance budgeting reform is enhanced allocative 
and productive efficiency in public expenditure – with the link between funding and 
performance measures.  In case of Thailand, this linkages need to be further 
strengthened.  Agencies need to proactively participate.  The central agencies must 
continue their development works.  Finally, the most important of all is to accelerate 
capacity building both for institutions and individuals in order to improve the reform 
participants’ abilities to overcome all immediate problems.   
Comparing with the other literatures reviewed, this dissertation has found the 
similarly conclusion that mistakes and setbacks are a normal and inevitable part of the 
reform processes.  Reformers require a long-term perspective because fundamental 
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change demands sustained effort, commitment and leadership over many generations.  
Assuring a success, reform programs had to be engineered – a reform plan formulated, 
an implementation strategy agreed, and implementation managed to achieve the 
objectives and sustain the reform initiative.  Additionally, the reform program had to 
be sold to the main stakeholders in the budget system and a reform team had to be 
identified and empowered to carry out the reform.       
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